Just over a month into the second term of Donald Trump’s presidency, U.S. foreign policy has been upended, especially in Europe.

The U.S. has aimed tariffs at neighbors, lambasted traditional allies in Europe, and taken a pro-Russian stance toward Ukraine in an about-face from the previous administration.

When asked if the transatlantic alliance between Europe and the U.S. is dead, veteran investor David Roche, strategist at Quantum Strategy, was unequivocal: “Yes … it is over.”

“Basically, the Trump administration is not interested in alliances, just deals,” he said. “Trust has been broken. You can’t have an alliance without trust.”

The question now is: What does that hold for Asia-Pacific, especially U.S. allies in the region?

Adam Garfinkle, former distinguished visiting fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, wrote in a Feb. 24 commentary that “U.S.-friendly Asian elites should not assume that U.S. assets will flow from being downsized in Europe to them in Asia.”

Asian allies should consider that a diminished U.S. global military footprint might render the logistics of U.S. security pledges in Asia more difficult, more expensive to manage, and less credible, Garfinkle wrote.

The U.S. has security treaties with six countries in Asia-Pacific, and has military bases in the Philippines, South Korea and Japan. Singapore, while not a U.S. treaty ally, has longstanding defense relations with the U.S. military.

Garfinkle also said that Asian countries hosting U.S. bases may not rise in importance or esteem, rather, they may face demands for greater “offset payments.”

“They should also not assume continuity for regional forums like the Quad and AUKUS. They should assume that all U.S. aid and capacity-building programs in their countries will end — and soon,” Garfinkle said.

The Quad refers to the diplomatic partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the U.S., while AUKUS refers to the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. These partnerships are not mutual defense treaties like NATO.

Roche said the stance taken by the Trump administration represents a “monumental shift.”

“Whether you are South Korea, Japan, even Singapore, yes, you cannot count on the U.S. to defend you … all those states in Asia, which implicitly or explicitly counted on U.S. protection, cannot count on that protection, and will not count on that protection,” he said.

On Feb. 12, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said at a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group that “stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe.”

“The United States faces consequential threats to our homeland. We must — and we are — focusing on security of our own borders,” he added.

One area of interest is the cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China. Since 2016, China has ramped up its rhetoric over the island, conducting multiple military drills and vowing “reunification” with Taiwan.

China has never relinquished its claim over Taiwan — which has been self-governing since the Chinese nationalist party, or Kuomintang, fled to the island following its defeat to the Communists in the Chinese civil war in 1949. Chinese President Xi Jinping regards reunification with the mainland as “a historical inevitability.”

Roche said that the Trump administration’s about-face on Ukraine dramatically increases the risk of Chinese military action against Taiwan.

“The Chinese must now be convinced that if they blockade, let’s say, energy tankers going to Taiwan, that the U.S. will not go to war for this,” he said.

However, Bernard Loo, coordinator of the strategic studies program at the S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies, said Taiwan will be relying on its so-called “silicon shield” to protect it.

This refers to the idea that Taiwan’s critical position in the chip industry would deter direct military action by China, as Taiwan is home to companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company and Foxconn — also known as Hon Hai Precision Industry, Loo said.

He also pointed out that while China may have a stronger military, the Russia-Ukraine war should have taught China that “war is really difficult.” He cites factors like the terrain, difficulty of resupplying forces for amphibious landings, and the unpredictable weather conditions in the Taiwan Strait, including possible typhoons.

“I would think that the last thing that Xi Jinping wants is war in Taiwan, simply because it’s just too iffy,” Loo said.

In a November 2024 analysis piece for the Asian-Pacific Leadership Network, Frank O’Donnell, a senior research advisor at the network, said, “Trump’s historic focus on the price, but not the value, of U.S. alliances and partnerships will form the lens through which his new administration views the region to an even greater degree than before.”

This viewpoint will trigger confrontations between the U.S. and key Indo-Pacific partners over whether Trump feels they are paying enough “protection money” for U.S. strategic cooperation and military deployments, he wrote.

In his first term, Trump signaled that South Korea should pay more for U.S. military presence there.

“This impulsiveness and unpredictability from Trump may push Indo-Pacific states to begin independently taking the necessary steps to improve their defense and political autonomy from the United States,” O’Donnell wrote.  

Roche said something like an “Asian NATO” could materialize, centered around Japan, South Korea and Singapore, as well as Taiwan. Other countries in Asia may also line up behind this entity, he said.

But at the heart of the matter is “the weakening of the credibility of the power of the United States on a global scale.”

“Whether you’re South Africa, Zimbabwe, the Congo with its minerals, or Singapore, the single biggest effect is the monumental devaluation of U.S. credibility as a currency,” Roche said.